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Introduction
What is the point in combining the concept of fundamentals with that
of civil religiosity? I think that religiosity in general, and also civil
religiosity, gives us the opportunity to see that fundamentals not only give
a foundation to our rules and meanings in a metaphysical sense, but also in
an emotional way. I will try to demonstrate this in the present contribution,
in which the civu religiosity of my own country, the Netherlands, will serve
as an example.
Charisma and Belonging
What is real and what is not? What is appropriate and what is not?
What is desirable and what is not? The answers to these questions are not
primarily given in our DNA, but are socially constructed (cf. Berger and
Luckmann, 1967: 47; Geertz, 1973: 92).
We need our community1 in order to survive. It gives us security and
food. Surviving presupposes that we have a sense of reality. This is one of
the main reasons why we need a community: to maintain our means of
orientation, that is to say, our reality. Contrary to what materialistic theories
of the social bond want us to believe, this aspect is no less important than
the economic one.
Our means of orientation consist of rules and meanings. In our
everyday interactions, we check, confirm and reinforce them. When I tell the
milkman that the weather is fine, I do a lot of different things: I show him
that I share the ideas and feelings (however obvious they may be) with
everybody else, and when he agrees, he confirms that he is in the same sym-
bolic order as I am, in which a certain kind of weather is considered as fine.
If the milkman does not agree with me, he has to explain why. If I do not
find his explanation plausible, I begin to feel a little bit uneasy. Suddenly I
realise that what I have taken for granted is not so self-evident.
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This uneasiness is the beginning of what might be called, with
Durkheim, anomie. In an anomie situation, rules and meanings no longer
seem to apply. They are not shared or sanctioned any more. My world
seems to be shaken. Who am I, where am I? Anomie causes the emotion of
anxiety2. This is a fundamental uncertainty. That is to say: it does not
concern some facts within reality, but reality, that is to say our worldview,
as such.
Anxiety, that may even turn into dread, is fear without an object. Not
any one object is concerned, but reality as a whole; what is true, what is
real, what is done and what is not are no longer confirmed in interactions
with others. So the whole meaning system is at stake.
What do we do when we fear something? We attack it, or we take
refuge with something or somebody appropriate. But what if there is nothing
real that we can identify as danger or as refuge? Then we are perplexed
indeed. We feel anxious and uncertain, but we do not know what to do. That
is the moment to use our imagination in accordance with the culture we live
in, in order to define what we are afraid of, and where salvation lies.
As we succeed in doing this, anxiety becomes fear. This causes an
enormous relief: at least we are saved from the fundamental uncertainty. Our
worldview is salvaged, our perplexity is gone. These feelings - fear and
relief - are a strange mixture. They are projected or ascribed to the object
that we found. He or it must be more than just human, for he restored what
we, as human beings, had lost: reality. He has a mysterious extra that we do
not understand. These ascriptions are well known in the social sciences.
They are called: charisma'. There are two kinds of charisma: positive
charisma, where feelings of relief and surrender are projected onto a
saviour; and negative charisma, where the feelings of relief and hostility are
projected onto a scapegoat.
It is not hard to find examples of both kinds. For many God has a
positive charisma, and the devil a negative one. Negative charismatic
projections have often been directed onto the Jews in Western tradition.
Interesting in this respect is that there is often a fluctuation between negative
and positive. Girard (1982), for instance, points out that in the Middle Ages
the Jews were alternately seen as poisoners of the wells and as magical
doctors. We can also see such an alternation in views of politicians like
Hitler. Hitler started as the 'saviour' of Germany, only to end as the 'cause'
of its destruction4. The same is true, though less dramatically, of President
Carter.
The charismatic object is not completely of this world. It seems to do
what normal people cannot: to reconstitute a reality when it seems lost. The
emotions that are involved here might be called religious. Anything can be
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charged with charisma; people as well as rules and meanings. Wherever
charisma is involved, we might speak of religiosity5.
Sacred Values and Fundamentals
The rules and meanings I will now discuss are those that cannot be
violated without big problems. Violating these special rules and meanings
causes perplexity, followed by anger. In sociology, the school of ethnome-
thodology became famous by experimenting with these so-called basic rules
and meanings (Garfinkel 1967: 41). We might also call them constitutive
meanings (cf. Searle, 1969: 33ff.), because denial of them is not just a
mistake, but implies the denial of the whole symbolic order, and thus of the
community as such. Anomie itself can be partial, vague and latent, but when
these basic rules are violated, it can become acute and concrete.
Most of these basic meanings and rules are latent and can only be
discovered by experiments like those that made Garfinkel famous. However,
some meanings, rules etc. that constitute the symbolic order are very well
known because they symbolise it as well. While symbolising the community
as such, these meaning also stand for the hopes and aspirations of that
community .The thought of even the slightest violation of these meanings
causes anxiety and aggression. Thus these basic rules and meanings acquire
a charismatic charge. To violate these rules is to violate the worldview on
which this community has been built. To respect these rules is to respect this
worldview.
This is a subclass of basic rules and meaning. We might call them
fundamental values: they are ultimate values that do not have to be
legitimated by other still more general values and that are considered to be
of universal validity. As such they serve as core directives for acting in all
kinds of situations. Moreover these values claim to be fundamental in terms
of priority as well as scope. This is the definition that constitutes the theme
of our conference, and we can see here why fundamental values are
fundamental. They are fundamental, not only in the philosophical sense that
the organisers of the conference seem to have in mind, as values on which
a construction of rules and meanings is founded, but also in an emotional
sense: this is where reason stops and anger begins. Here culture is anchored
in the emotional make-up of the members of a community.
Fundamentals are those meanings or rules that are so deeply emo-
tionally anchored and charged with charisma that they produce a deep,
almost inescapable loyalty to a worldview and thus to a community. For that
reason, we might call them religious6. This deeply-felt loyalty is the
ultimate meaning, as far as a social scientist can trace it. Durkheim claimed
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that God was society. Since then, sociologists have become too modest to
say anything about God, but we can say something about religiosity.
Combining Durkheim's terminology with that of Weber, we might say that
community as a whole is not god, but that its ultimate values may be
charged with charisma and thus become religious.
We might go even further and say that these values may be sacred,
because they are both fundamental and charged with charisma. A third
reason for using the term sacred is the special status these values may have,
both functionally and emotionally. They are set apart: they are a condition
for a discourse, in one way or another, but can never be the object of
discussion7.
Let me give an example. In Western democracy, freedom is a
precondition for a democratic discussion, but it is itself beyond debate. The
way in which this principle is implemented, or has to be guaranteed, can be
discussed, but not the principle as such. It symbolises the West, its ambitions
and its hopes. Where this principle is lacking, there reigns, in the words of
Ronald Reagan, the "Evil Empire". This principle, and its violation, causes
a thrill (negative charisma). This gives us a strong sense of belonging to the
community. It inspires us. We are ready to defend it, to propagate it, and we
are ready even to pay for it with our lives. More than that, we are ready to
sacrifice the whole world to it. I therefore think this principle might be
called "sacred", and therefore religious.
Civil religion
Every community has its basic rules and its fundamental values. One
of the characteristics of modern society is its differentiation. This means that
we are members of more than one community at the same time. Some of
these communities are, of course, more important than others. Some of them
are highly important and have to do, ultimately, with physical or psycho-
logical survival. This certainly seems the case with the political community.
When the sacred of the political community is at stake, we might speak of
civil religiosity.
The concept of civil religion was coined by Rousseau (Contrat Social,
IV 8) after an idea that is much older and can be traced back even to Plato:
that loyalty to the state or community must have a religious foundation. The
interesting point in Rousseau, however, is that he considered a religious
basis for the state necessary notwithstanding its purely rational foundation.
This idea was worked out for modern industrial society by many social
thinkers in the first half of the nineteenth century, including the father of
sociology, Auguste Comte. He formulated a political religion that cost him
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the support of many of his positivistic friends, including J.S. Mill. The aim
of this religion was to give the members of a highly specialised society a
sense of oneness and purpose. Durkheim put the need of religion into the
perspective of mutual interdependence, due to the division of labour, in his
earlier work. Later he stressed that every community would produce its own
religious ideas and practices (Durkheim, 1915: 428). The scope he had in
mind certainly was the political community.
Under the influence of purely materialistic theories, these ideas have
become obsolete. They have been «introduced in modern social thought by
Bellah8, thus explicating and elaborating a central notion of the Parsonian
way of thinking, while borrowing many ideas from Will Herberg with his
idea of cultural religion. Bellah's general idea is that a political community
cannot exist withoutsome religious foundation. Unlike Rousseau and Comte,
however, he is not so much interested in what civil religion should be, but
in what it is. Bellah restricted his analysis to "civil religion in America". It
inspired many other studies, all mostly confined to the level of the nation.
This has become more or less the trend, but, of course, there are more
political communities, both at regional or local and at a multinational level.
All these communities have their civil religiosity in a stronger or weaker
form. The idea of freedom, that I just took as an example, is clearly
supranational. It shapes the identity of the West, despite many national
modalities, and as such it is important.
A case study: civil religiosity in the Dutch State
I will now illustrate how civil religion develops in a modern state with
the example of my own political community: the Dutch state in the twentieth
century.
The foundations of Dutch civil religion were laid in the early seven-
teenth century when a political unity, propped up by patriotism, had to be
shaped after the revolt against Spanish rule (Laeyendecker, 1982; Schama,
1988: 5 If.). The rhetoric was in the style of the Old Testament and was anti-
Catholic. A common history was constructed by important national scholars,
following the models of Livy and Tacitus.
The anti-Catholic rhetoric became problematic two centuries later when
the Dutch provinces were reunited with the Belgian ones. At the coronation
of King William I, the rhetoric had to be adapted to a new, predominantly
Catholic audience, and acquired a general Christian character (Wierdsma,
1986: 294). We cannot be very optimistic about the plausibility of this move.
Anyway, the union between the northern and the southern part of the
Netherlands did not last.
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Later on, the civil religion, as far at it is expressed in the inaugural
speeches of the successive monarchs, became more and more generalised,
due to the accentuated separation of church and state and the ongoing
process of secularisation (Wierdsma, op. cit.). This is an interesting example
of value-generalisation. The core of the values that remained were the values
of the French Revolution: freedom, equality and solidarity. These are basic
values, which still constitute our democracy today.
Until the twentieth century, however, the local community and the
church seem to have been much more important for most people than the
national political community. When modernisation made national society
more important, the local and clerical authorities tried to resist modern
trends by organising themselves at the national level in what were later
called pillars, but what was meant as a means of resistance to modernisation
proved in the long run to be a vehicle of adaptation.
The development of our civil religion was both complicated and
reinforced by this so-calledpillarisation. Society was split into at least three
pillars or sub-societies on the basis of religion or a metaphysical worldview:
a Catholic, a Calvinist, and a so-called "general" pillar. The cleavage went
deep, as trade unions, political parties, broadcasting organisations and even
sport were organised along these lines. Both David Martin and Roland
Robertson hold that this cleavage made a Dutch civil religion impossible
(Martin, 1978: 117f.; Robertson, 1978: 81). In my opinion, the contrary is
the case. It was, paradoxically, the cause of quite a strong civil religiosity.
What has to be explained is the fact that, despite the deep cleavages, the
Netherlands was a unity and a stable democracy. It was spared the hard fate
of the Lebanon, the Balkans or Northern Ireland. Lijphart's well-known
explanation for this was the consensus of the pragmatic leaders at the top of
the pillars (Lijphart, 1979: 191), but this explanation is not enough, and it
is hardly sociological. What Lijphart does not tell us is how this pragmatic
attitude and this consensus were possible.
In my opinion, the explanation should be sought in social history. The
oldest pillars were Christian. They came into being in order to defend
traditional Christianity against the godless modernity of socialism and liberal-
ism'. Modernisation could not be stopped. Modern political movements
were attractive and the Christian pillars had to accommodate. Modern
institutions came into being inside the pillars, such as Catholic or Calvinist
political parties, schools, broadcasting companies, trade unions, employers"
associations, etc. In order for the pillars to survive, the leaders had to make
compromises between the several Interest groups time and again. Since the
basis of the pillars was religious, these compromises were legitimated by
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Christian values. After the Second World War, that meant in terms of the
Sermon on the Mount in a quite abstract way.
In the socialist pillar the reverse happened. In order to compete with the
Christian pillars, it developed
a kind of secular religion, somewhere in between humanism and liberal
Protestantism. This made it possible to escape the reproach of being purely
materialistic. The same was true for other groups that did not explicitly
belonged to a church, such as the bourgeoisie.
So the pillars had three important things more or less in common:
1. the socio-economic make-up;
2. some kind of Christian humanistic background, that could be formulated,
as far as practical issues were concerned, in terms like brotherhood, freedom
and equality; values that could be taken from the Sermon on the Mount as
well as from revolutionary theories;
3. the importance attached to a religious or metaphysical legitimation of
interests.
As a result of this socio-economic make-up, the leaders of the pillars
all had to make the same middle-of-the-road compromises inside their
pillars. They all had to satisfy their left wing and their right wing, their
workers and their upper middle class, in order to keep their pillar together.
They all had to legitimise this compromise (in terms of religious or
metaphysical values), and they all did so in the same way. It was therefore
not hard for them to understand each other. At the moment they met to take
decisions at the national level, they had all gone through the same negoti-
ations in their own circle. The results were more or less the same, and thus
it was relatively easy to achieve consensus on practical issues. So the
organisation of dissension made possible a national consensus in a miracu-
lous way. This consensus had a religious basis, and this became the rather
implicit civil religion of the Dutch state.
Its importance became clear after World War II, during the making of
the welfare state. Solidarity, Equality and Freedom were the basic values
that were used to legitimate it and with growing enthusiasm. The consensus
was very broad, with the exception of some very small, extremist political
parties (the Communists and the Christian fundamentalists). In fact, by their
dissension, these small parties excluded themselves from the political
discourse. Gradually, the welfare state and its moral foundations became a
source of national feeling. New laws of the welfare state were accepted in
parliament in an atmosphere of national euphoria: "We have a system of
social security that is not equalled in the world!"
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A picture was confirmed, in a secularised way, of a country, that,
however small it might be, had its role to play in the big world. Having
thrown out the Spaniards in the sixteenth century, it became a refuge for
anyone who was persecuted, and now it had the most elaborate system in the
world, in which solidarity, freedom and equality were guaranteed.
This self-image of the Dutch, charged with positive charisma, was, after
the completion of the welfare state in the 1970s, more and more comple-
mented by what was charged with negative charisma: nazism, fascism,
racism. The mythology for this was taken from the German Occupation
during the Second World War, when the sacred values had been totally
violated, and that meant hell. This must never happen again. The more the
memory of this period blurred, the more important this mythology became.
It is kept alive by an ever growing literature and history, both fictional and
non-fictional; of works of non-fiction, the Diary of Anne Frank achieved
worldwide fame. This is the mythology of Dutch civil religiosity.
The values of Dutch civil religiosity are celebrated in various rituals.
There is, to begin with, the annual Remembrance Day on Dam Square in
Amsterdam. The whole political community is there. The Mayor of
Amsterdam or the Prime Minister make a short speech, in which the past,
the present and the future are connected. "We should always remember,
because it must never happen again, but it happens now, in many countries
that are less well off than we are, and therefore we should fight for freedom
and justice all over the world. This is our duty and the dead we commemor-
ate today should be our models of courage." This is the message, and, no
matter who makes the speech, it is always the same. After this, members of
the political community, led by the Queen with her German husband, lay
wreaths on the national monument.
There are also the more spontaneous rituals, for instance in parliament,
when there is something on the agenda that has an immediate connection
with the basic values, or with the German Occupation. At such times, the
politicians do not debate and argue, but they confess in a highly emotional
atmosphere that contrasts sharply with the normal routine. The last time this
happened in the Dutch parliament was two years ago, when the last two
German war criminals were released. On such occasions the charismatic
charge of the fundamental values becomes tangible.
When we look at Dutch civil religiosity, several things strike us. To
begin with, it was clearly a social construction. Sometimes it was very
deliberately made, sometimes it was the outcome of a social mechanism, but
it was always the product of a well-understood self interest of the different
categories of the Dutch population. Time and again, these values seem
important for the Dutch, both in themselves and as a means to structure
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community. Confessing belief in these values gives the Dutch a we-feeling.
Thus, it is important for the making of the Dutch nation.
The Dutch nation as such is based on it, as is the making of important
social institutions within Dutch society, such as the elaborate welfare state.
Its responses to crises are influenced by it. For instance, during the period
of high unemployment in the 1980s, it proved impossible to propose to send
the migrant workers (Turks, Moroccans, and South Americans) back home.
Without adhering to these values, it is very hard to participate in
political discussion in the Netherlands, as the members of small racist parties
experienced when they were boycotted by all the other parties. Whoever
wants to play a role, however small, in any political arena, has to subscribe
to the central values of Dutch civil religion. The sanction is exclusion from
political discussion. A Dutch politician, Janmaat, who violated one of these
values by labelling the immigrants as inferior, caused a commotion that is
in no way proportional to his actual power. He placed himself outside the
political order. He is boycotted by all his colleagues in parliament, as if he
were unclean.
The fundamental values I mentioned are beyond doubt or discussion,
and in this sense the values are set apart: socialists, conservatives and Chris-
tian Democrats differ about the interpretation of these values, but not about
the values as such.
This is, in outline, Dutch civil religiosity. It consists of some
fundamental sacred values, which both constitute and symbolise the political
order. They are beyond discussion and are charged with charisma. Does this
mean that every member of the political community believes in these values?
Not necessarily. It only means that every participant in the political process
must confess that he believes in them, whether he does or not. But a
majority certainly does.
Nor does it mean that the state always tries to realise the values which
are central in the civil religiosity. No religion tries or is able to fulfil its
ideals. For instance, the right of inheritance, clearly at odds with any idea
of socio-economic equality, is still maintained. Negation is the strategy to
cope with a problem like this. It is simply not on the political agenda.
Nobody talks about it. It seems to be forgotten. Meanwhile, the members of
the political community believe that they have realised the value of equality
as far as possible.
Dynamics of political religiosity
This is what Dutch civil religiosity is like. It is a social construction,
forced by circumstances and pragmatically adopted. Equally adhered to by
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almost all groups in the political arena, it developed without attracting much
notice, together with the making of the welfare state. It is unwritten, implicit
and not systematic. People are not aware that they have an implicit civil
religiosity, which is why I prefer to speak of religiosity rather than of
religion. The term religion suggests more coherence and systematic
elaboration than is present in Dutch civil religiosity.
There are more fiilly-fledged civil religions. American civil religiosity
is more elaborated than the Dutch, but here too, civil religiosity came into
being unintentionally. Until recently, Marxism-Leninism was a complete
state religion in the USSR, with a central saint, Lenin, whose grave became
a place of pilgrimage, etc. It was implicit, in that it was not seen as a
religion, but as the result scientific analysis. Unlike American or Dutch civil
religiosity, it was enforced. It was also total: it covered not only the political
community but every aspect of life and it promised salvation for everyone.
As such it replaced the old suppressed orthodox state religion. Nazism
seems, as an implicit civil religion, to have been less fully-fledged and more
voluntarily accepted by the population for quite a long time. It was less
totalitarian, leaving some room for other religions. Nevertheless, Nazism
pretended to bring salvation to the people and greatness to the German state.
Both Nazism and Communism disappeared with the forms of government
that they supported.
Whatever the level of elaboration may be, civil religiosity is always
very dynamic. It comes into being together with the formation of a political
community and is the foundation and the core of the political culture. As
such it consists of fundamental values, but as a product of social circum-
stances, it varies with the social and political process. Fundamental values
may be absolute and even sacred, but this does not mean that they do not
change.
This becomes very clear in the Dutch situation. In the first place, the
emancipation of the Catholics, the separation of Church and State, and the
secularisation of society as a whole caused a generalisation of the fundamen-
tal values which were at first linked to Protestant theology. Secondly, the
interpretation of the fundamental values is different in every pillar or party
programme. For instance, equality is a fundamental, sacred value, but for
the conservatives (in the Netherlands, the liberal party WD) this means
equality in (socio-economic) opportunities, while for the social democrats it
means equality in circumstances. Thirdly, priorities change. In the sixties
and early seventies, equality (more or less in the social democratic
interpretation) had a priority over freedom. This applied to the whole
political spectrum. Equality was seen as a condition of freedom. In the
eighties, the reverse has been the case. Freedom (in the conservative
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interpretation) is now seen as a precondition for equality. This is clearly an
effect of the economic recession.
The Scope of Civil Religiosity
If we ask what the importance of this civil religiosity is, we must take
its scope into consideration. This is the political community. Without it, the
Dutch state, i.e. the most important institution in Dutch society, would lack
any spiritual hasis. It would not have a last criterium of the absolute truth,
and, what is more important, the ultimate significance of this truth would not
be felt. However, the Dutch case also clearly demonstrates that this spiritual
basis is not purely spiritual. In its origin as well as in its existence, it is in
interaction with economic interests and power constellations. The making of
civil religiosity thus is less a matter of revelation than of the necessity to
cope with one another in order to survive. During and after its construction,
it gives people charismatic feelings. In retrospect they reconstruct their
values and then they seem to be revealed.
Dutch civil religiosity provides the standards for political and much
public debate. This makes it very important. All the same, since society is
differentiated, its scope is limited. It may be impossible, for instance, to
make a joke about blacks in the public debate (this would be discrimination
and thus against the rule of equality), but in many private communities, this
may be no problem at all. Here, other emotions and other interests are
important, and, accordingly, other fundamental values.
Though the scope of civil religiosity may be limited to the political
community, it may have a much wider relevance as an example of how
fundamental values form the foundation of the meaning system of commun-
ities as such. What is true of the making of political fundamentals must be
true of the fundamentals in most other communities as well.
Meerten B. ter Borg is a reader in the sociology of religion at the Univer-
sity of Leiden. He has published on many subjects in English and Dutch,
including books (in Dutch) on the nature of modern religion, nihilism and
death.
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Notes
1. I refer here to Nisbet's definition of community: "By community I refer to
much more than what is denoted by mere local community. I use the word
[...] in its oldest and lasting sense of relationships among individuals that are
characterised by a high degree of personal intimicay, of social cohesion or
moral commitment, and of continuity in time" (Nisbet, 1974: 1).
2. Here I am combining Durkheim with notions from both the symbolic-
interactionist and the existentialist tradition. What I call anxiety is meant to be
a translation of the German 'Angst'. This word is often translated as 'dread'.
I have chosen 'anxiety' because this seems to have less heavy and dramatic
connotation.
3. What I have in mind is the normal Weberian idea of charisma, but here it is
combined with the ideas of anomie, anxiety and reality maintenance. It would
go too far in this context to elaborate the theoretical problems involved in this
eclectic combination.
4. We see this kind of alternation quite often in different forms with a changing
charismatic charge. We see this in the US, for instance in the discussions on
the merits of various presidents, especially Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan.
And in the American mind, the USSR turned from an evil empire into the
country where the peacemaker Gorby came from.
5. The idea that charisma is a good criterium of what religion is is completely in
tune with Weber {1972: 245). The reasoning I put forward here is elaborated
(in Dutch) in Ter Borg (1991).
6. The concept of religiosity developed here is not far from Geertz's well-known
definitions and purposes. Geertz's definition is as follows: (1) a system of
symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting
moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general
order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of
/actuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic (Geertz,
1973: 90).
7. Thus Durkheim's famous definition would be applicable: A religion is a unified
system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things
set apart and forbidden beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral
community called a Church all those who adhere to them (Durkheim, 1915:
47). The mixture of emotions that I describe here is in line with the way in
which Rudolf Otto defined the sacred (Otto, 1922; Eliade, 1959: 8).
8. Unfortunately, these ideas have not received much influence outside the
sociology of religion (Mathisen, 1989).
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9. This is what the genius behind the Christian pillars, Abraham Kuyper, called
"the antithesis".
